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Informational Cascades: A Mirage? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Experimental research found contradictory results regarding the occurrence of informational 
cascades. Whereas Anderson and Holt (1997) confirmed the model of Banerjee (1992), and 
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) through lab tests, Huck and Oechssler (2000) came to 
contradictory results on crucial issues. This article presents experimental evidence supporting 
further doubts concerning “Bayesian” informational cascades: Just under two thirds of all 
decisions are characterized by an excessive orientation towards the private signal, and only a 
small number of the subjects (<6%) make rational decisions systematically and consistently. 
 
JEL classification: C91; D82 
Keywords: Informational cascades; Experiments; Bayes’ rule 
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Rational herding and the precise circumstances under which it can arise have been studied by 
economists for around 70 years.1 The theory of informational cascades put forward by 
Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) has enlivened this debate considerably. 
Particular attention has been paid in this context to herds that occur because subjects draw 
conclusions about the private signals of their predecessors on the basis of their actions and 
then take into account the reliability of their own and their predecessors’ private signals and 
the a priori probability before finally making a rational decision by correctly using Bayes’ 
rule.2 This combination of circumstances will be referred to here as “Bayesian” informational 
cascades.3
The first to present experimental evidence were Anderson and Holt (1997). According to 
them, “Bayesian” informational cascades occur regularly.4 Huck and Oechssler (2000), 
however, come to a different result. According to their understanding, the correct use of 
Bayes’ rule is annulled by a systematic overrating of the respective private signals. This study 
investigates this contradiction. 
1. Experimental Design 
Each subject has to solve three tasks (Table 1).5 Let A and B denote the possible decisions, a 
and b be possible signals, and α and β possible states of the world. The subjects have to 
decide between two alternative actions A and B. α has an a priori probability of 0.49 and β of 
0.51. They are informed which private signal (a or b) they have, how good the reliability of 
their private signal (q) is, and how good the reliability of their predecessors’ private signal is 
                                                 
1 The two approaches of reputational herding and investigative herding date back to Keynes (1936). 
2 As in the famous restaurant example used by Banerjee. 
3 This specification is necessary, as the concept of informational cascades put forward by Banerjee and by 
Bikhchandani et al. was initially used as a generic term for various explanatory approaches (e.g. sanctions on 
deviants, positive pay-off externalities, conformity preference). 
4 Hung and Plott (2001), Sgroi (2003) and Celen and Kariv (2004) analyze various model extensions. Partly 
explicitly, partly at least with regard to various marginal aspects, these studies support the results of Anderson 
and Holt.  
5 The tasks are similar to the study of Huck and Oechssler. See Appendix A for the text of the tasks. 
Appendix C for detailed solution methods. Appendices are available on the JEBO website. 
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(p). Finally they get to know which decisions their predecessors made. They are also told that 
all predecessors have exactly one private signal and have made rational decisions. Then they 
have to decide between actions A and B. 
Table 1 
The three decision tasks 
 Previous  
decisions 
 
p 
 
Signal 
 
q Rational  action 
Task 1 B 0.80 a 0.80 B 
Task 2 ABB 0.65 a 0.65 B 
Task 3 AA 0.60 b 0.65 A 
With an a priori probability for β = 0.51 and for α = 0.49. 
These three decision-making situations have the clear advantage that they allow a distinct 
differentiation as to whether the subjects act according to A derson and Holt, or according to 
Huck and Oechssler’s interpretation. The subjects either make a rational decision in the sense 
of “Bayesian” informational cascades, or they trust their own private signal.  
This clear distinction, which for the first time allows a clear discrimination between the two 
stated explanation patterns, is an important advance. To a considerable degree, both the 
analyses of Anderson and Holt and the study of Huck and Oechssler present decision-making 
situations in which the strict orientation towards one’s own private signal leads to the same 
decision as an inference of the private signals of the predecessors and, based on this, a rational 
use of Bayes’ rule. 
Table 2 
The distinction between the two explanatory patterns 
 Solution that obtains by  
rational decision-making 
Solution that obtains by strong  
overweighting of the private signal 
Task 1 B A 
Task 2 B A 
Task 3 A B 
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227 subjects took part in six sessions with respective totals of 55, 50, 46, 37, 24 and 15 
persons. In each of the six sessions the subjects were divided into three groups. These groups 
varied with regard to the order in which the tasks had to be solved. All subjects were students 
at the Wolfsburg University of Applied Sciences who study business administration. None of 
them had any experience of experimental research, and all had a thorough education in the 
calculus of probability. The use of a pocket calculator was allowed. There was no payment for 
participation in this experiment. Those subjects who correctly solve tasks received bonus 
points for a later exam.6  
2. Results 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the six sessions. “R” (for “Right”) marks those decisions 
that can be called correct in the sense of a rational decision given the deduction of the private 
signals of the predecessors and the correct use of Bayes’ rule. Thus “R” marks all those 
decisions that confirm the approach of Anderson and Holt. “W” (for “Wrong”) marks those 
decisions which are not based on rationale but rather follow the person’s own private signal. 
Thus “W” highlights all those decisions which confirm Huck and Oechssler’s approach. 
In total, the subjects made 681 decisions (see Table 3). Only 248 of them, or 36%, were 
answered correctly in the rational sense. 433 decisions were wrong, so in 64% of all decisions 
the subjects either failed to draw conclusions from their predecessors’ decisions about their 
private signals, did not correctly use Bayes’ rule, and/or based their decisions on completely 
different aspects.  
 
                                                 
6 For the effect of such incentives see Selten et al. (2003, p. 22). Those subjects who correctly solve all tasks 
receive 15 bonus points for a later exam (five bonus points for each correctly solved task). Other students were 
asked how much 15 bonus points for a later exam were worth to them, were they able to buy the 15 bonus points. 
The 42 students asked gave numbers between € 25 and € 200. The average was € 72.45. 
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Table 3 
Summary of the results of the whole study  
   G r o u p    
   
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
∑ 
R W R W R W R W 
32 46 22 52 28 47 82 145 
 
1 
Task 1 Task 3 Task 2 36% 64% 
R W R W R W R W 
35 43 33 41 11 64 79 148 
 
2 
Task 2 Task 1 Task 3 35% 65% 
R W R W R W R W 
27 51 33 41 27 48 87 140 
R
 
u
 
n
 
 
3 
Task 3 Task 2 Task 1 38% 62% 
 R W R W R W R W 
 
 
∑ 94 140 88 134 66 159 248 433 
  40% 60% 40% 60% 29% 71% 36% 64% 
 
R = Right (in the sense of a rational decision with correct use of Bayes’ rule); W = Wrong (the decision follows 
a private signal). 
 
 
 
What further aggravates the situation is that of the 248 right decisions, only a minority are 
accompanied by a correct reason for the decision. Table 4 summarizes the methods of 
solution given by those subjects who made “right” decisions. It becomes obvious that less 
than a quarter of the right decisions are based on the right rationale. For about 40% of the 
right decisions either faulty, nonsensical or no methods were given. Approximately every 
tenth person stated that they only guessed. About a quarter of the correct decisions are based 
on simplifying thumb rules: around 10% of the subjects are oriented towards the a priori 
probability, and 15% just decide as the majority of their predecessors did. 
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Table 4 
Explanations given by subjects for the 248 “right” decisions 
Methods given to arrive at the “right” decisions Number Percentage 
Right method (inferring the private signals of the predecessors 
and correct use of Bayes’ rule) 
 
58 
 
23.4% 
Faulty use of Bayes’ rule / nonsensical or incomprehensible 
methods 
 
88 
 
35.5% 
No method given as to how the stated solution was arrived at 12 4.8% 
Guessed 26 10.5% 
Decision according to the majority decision of the predecessors 38 15.3% 
Decision according to the a priori probability 26 10.5% 
 
Only about 36% of the decisions are made according to the postulate of “Bayesian” 
informational cascades. Of these 36% about three quarters of the decisions are made for the 
wrong reasons and are therefore only accidentally correct. Regarding the whole population 
this means that not even every tenth decision is a correct one based on the correct reasons. 
As 64% of all decisions correspond to the person’s own private signals, and although this 
could in no case lead to the right decision (and thus to a reward), it must be presumed that a 
large part of the decision making was excessively influenced by own private signals. The 
present study results confirm the explanatory approach of Huck and Oechssler.  
Examination of the number of correct decisions per participant permits further insights 
(Figure 1). 41% of the subjects followed their own private signal in all three situations. 
Around 45% of the subjects gave both right and wrong answers. Only around 13% of the 
participants solved all three tasks correctly. Median results (one or two right decisions) were 
only obtained by persons who neither systematically followed their own private signal nor 
made consistently rational decisions. These are the persons who guessed or who followed 
irrational thumb rules that purely coincidentally lead to success or failure. However, it is also 
possible to obtain three correct or three incorrect answers with random decisions. In the case 
of three decisions with two alternative answers each, only three-fourths of the subjects who 
simply guess or make random decisions attain a median result (one or two right decisions). If 
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this is taken into account, it is revealed that around 60% (7.6% + 23.1% + 22.3% + 7.6%) of 
subjects tend towards decisions made at random, about a third always follow their own 
private signal, and only around 6% make systematic rational decisions. 
0
15
30
45
no right
decision
(41.0%)
1 right
decision
(23.1%)
2 right
decisions
(22.3%)
3 right
decisions
(13.5%)
Strategy "Bayes Rule" (5.9%)
Strategy "Private Signal" (33.4%)
Random Decisions (60.6%)
Fig. 1. Classification of the subjects into four groups according to their level of success 
 
Further results stress that it cannot be assumed that subjects act in a consistently rational 
manner: 
1. A review of the three groups that had to solve the tasks in varying orders shows 
significantly varying success rates (see Table 3). While the results of group 1 (order: Task 1, 
Task 2, Task 3) and group 2 (order: Task 3, Task 1, Task 2) are almost exactly alike (success 
rate 40%), group 3 (order: Task 2, Task 3, Task 1) achieved a success rate of only 29%. Such 
considerable variations of the success rate, which solely result from varying task orders, are 
no indication of rational decision making behavior by the subjects.  
2. The three tasks do not have corresponding success rates. As can be seen in Table 5, Task 3 
is solved in only 26% of all cases, while Task 1 and 2 are solved correctly in more than 40%. 
This clear difference between the success rates does not indicate that the subjects are willing 
and able to apply Bayes’ rule appropriately to concrete decision-making situations (in 
potential “Bayesian” informational cascades), although they fundamentally manage the 
necessary procedures of probability calculation.  
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Table 5 
Different success rates of the three tasks 
 Task 1 Task 2 Task 3 
Group R W R W R W 
1 
2 
3 
32 
33 
27 
46 
41 
48 
35 
33 
28 
43 
41 
47 
27 
22 
11 
51 
52 
64 
 
∑ 92 41% 
135 
59% 
96 
42% 
131 
58% 
60 
26% 
167 
74% 
R = Right (in the sense of a rational decision with correct use of Bayes’ rule); W = Wrong (the decision follows 
a private signal). 
 
3. In the sixth and last session with 15 students (who already have an engineering degree and 
are presently completing postgraduate business administration studies comparable to an 
MBA), the ban on communication is lifted. The students receive the three tasks and have to 
hand in the solutions to the experimenter 36 hours later. Interchange is explicitly allowed, and 
the consultation of textbooks or expert opinions is not forbidden. When some of the 
participants are not intellectually up to the task but still strive for the best possible rational 
decision, it can be expected that they will use the time to gather information and to make the 
correct decisions. As can be seen from Table 6 the success rates are surprisingly similar to 
those of the rest of the study: 38% of all tasks were answered correctly, and for 62% of all 
tasks wrong answers were given. Obviously the decisions are based on different decision-
making preferences than the “Bayesian” informational cascades suggest. The majority of the 
subjects do not seem to look for rational, best possible decisions by applying Bayes’ rule.  
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Table 6 
The results of the six sessions 
Session I II III IV V VI 
Number of correct answers 57 60 51 35 28 17 
Number of false answers 108 90 87 76 44 28 
Percentage of correct answers 35% 40% 38% 32% 39% 38% 
Percentage of false answers 65% 60% 62% 68% 61% 62% 
Session I: 55 undergraduate students; session II: 50 graduate students; session III: 46 undergraduate students; 
session IV: 37 graduate students; session V: 24 undergraduate and graduate students; session VI: 15 
postgraduate students (corresponds to MBA). 
 
A certain amount of variation in the six sessions can be clearly seen (Table 6). The percentage 
of correct answers varies between 32% in session IV and 40% in session II, but no session 
provides a majority of correct solutions. There is no indication that the contradiction between 
Anderson and Holt’s and Huck and Oechssler’s results can be explained by accidental, 
biasing peculiarities of the subject populations.  
Therefore, the present results in no way support the estimation that “Bayesian” informational 
cascades can occur in reality. In the end, the model of “Bayesian” informational cascades only 
works when the successors can be sure that their predecessors have made rational decisions. 
However, the results of the study show that one certainly can not assume that all predecessors 
have made rational decisions. Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004) reveal that the successors do not 
really rely on their predecessors. In their study, the subjects (in contrast to this study) are left 
in the dark as to whether their predecessors made rational decisions or not. It turns out that the 
subjects always believe their predecessors to be less capable of rational decisions than 
themselves.7   
                                                 
7 More recent studies have shown that noisy behavior of the other subjects can frequently lead to 
considerable deviations from rational decision-making; see Goeree and Holt (1999, 2004). However, this does 
not explain the results presented here, as all the subjects were very clearly informed that all predecessors had 
made perfectly rational decisions. These newer studies do, however, emphasise existing doubts about whether 
informational cascades can genuinely occur in reality. Real decision-making situations are namely characterized 
by noisy behavior of the other subjects. 
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3. Conclusion 
The contradictory results of the experimental studies of Anderson and Holt and of Huck and 
Oechssler were the point of departure for this study. A total of 227 subjects were confronted 
with decision-making situations that permit a clear differentiation between orientation 
towards rationale and orientation towards the person’s own private signal. 
Of the total number of 681 decisions, only 248 (36%) were based on rationale. Of these 248 
decisions only 58 were made for the right reasons. For the other 190 correct decisions it 
became obvious that the subjects had either decided by simplifying irrational thumb rules, had 
only guessed, or were not able to sketch a comprehensible way to the solution. Similarly, in 
433 decision-making situations (64%) the participants made decisions that were contrary to 
the rational solution and in favor of their private signal. 
Further results indicate that subjects are rarely willing to calculate the probabilities and then 
make a rational decision: 1. the order in which the tasks are presented influences the results, 
2. the degree to which the subjects successfully deal with the three decision-making situations 
varies considerably, and 3. the success rates are not increased by the lifting of the 
communication ban and the possibility to refer to text books and expert opinions.  
The urge to decide by simplifying thumb rules is obviously very strong, at least for these 
kinds of decision-making situations. Only a small number (< 6%) of the subjects 
systematically made a rational decision, considered all probabilities, and correctly applied 
Bayes’ rule. 
In some decision-making situations, one can obtain very good results by simplifying thumb 
rules or just by guessing.8 This type of behavior can therefore sometimes even be meaningful, 
if one considers that finding the right solution can be rather strenuous. In this experiment, 
                                                 
8 Huck et al. (2003, 2004), for example, show that in a sequence of decision-making situations, subjects can 
come very close to the optimal solution with simple trial and error strategies without having recognized the 
background to the decision-making situation and thus the systematic way to reach a solution. 
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however, the subjects face considerable disadvantages. Those who simply guess lose an 
average of half of their “fee” (7.5 bonus points ≈ € 36.23). Those who always follow their 
private signal actually lose their whole compensation (15 bonus points ≈ € 72.45). On average 
for all subjects, just under two thirds of their possible bonus is lost (9.58 bonus points ≈ € 
46.30). The use of simplifying thumb rules or pure guesswork therefore involves significant 
losses. The fact that the subjects accept these losses indicates that their preference for the use 
of simplifying thumb rules is highly developed. 
This study confirms the results of Huck and Oechssler. The results of Anderson and Holt,  
however, will presumably have to be reinterpreted: if a number of subjects have to make 
decisions against the background of one private signal and their observation of the decisions 
of their predecessors, undoubtedly decision sequences emerge that look like “Bayesian” 
informational cascades. Then, however, one needs to examine whether the subjects have 
consistently made rational decisions or not. 
Table 7 
Banerjee’s restaurant example 
Subject 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Private signal b a a a a a a 
Decision B B B B B B B 
With an a priori probability for β = 0.51 and for α = 0.49. 
 
When a laboratory experiment leads to a situation such as the one given in Table 7 one may 
not simply infer the existence of a “Bayesian” informational cascade. Maybe subjects 2 and 3 
decide merely upon the a priori probability, subjects 4 and 5 only according to the majority of 
their predecessors, and subjects 6 and 7 possibly only guess and hope to luck out and make a 
favorable decision. What then looks like a sequence of rational decisions derived by 
observing the actions of the predecessors, by drawing conclusions about their private signals, 
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and correctly using Bayes’ rule is in reality nothing more than an ostensible “Bayesian”  
informational cascade. 
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Appendix A. Text of the Tasks 
Task 3: 
You must decide between alternative actions A and B. When you make the right decision you 
will get 5 bonus points for the exam.  
To begin with, action A is right in 49% of all cases, and action B is right in 51% of all cases.  
Before you have to make your decision you will receive a hint (either “a” or “b”) towards the 
right action. This hint reveals the correct action to you in 65 out of 100 cases.9 This means: 
should you receive the hint “b”, in 65 out of 100 cases action B is the right one. 
Other persons before you were confronted with this decision making situation. Person 1 had 
to make his decision first, then person 2, and so forth. Each person could see the decision their 
predecessors made, but not the hints these persons received. You know that the reliability of 
the hints for the persons before you was only 60%.10 This means: should one of these persons 
for example receive hint “b”, in only 60 out of 100 cases is action B correct. All participants 
receive exactly one hint. The hints are independent of each other. All persons who already 
made their decision made a rational decision. 
You are the third person to decide. The two predecessors decided thus: A  A 
You receive hint “b”.11
Which action should you now choose?            A  B 
 
Please briefly explain upon which rationale you based your decision, or which way, if at all, 
you went about resolving this problem. These explanations have no influence on the granting 
of bonus points for the exam, therefore you should give an open and honest answer here! 
                                                 
9 Task 1: 80 out of 100 cases; Task 2: 65 out of 100 cases. 
10 Task 1: also 80%; Task 2: also 65%. 
11 Task 1: You are the second person to decide. The person before you chose action B. You receive hint “a”; 
Task 2: You are the 4th person to decide. The three predecessors decided thus:  A  B  B. You receive hint “a”. 
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Appendix B. Detailed results of the six sessions 
Table 8 
Session I: 55 undergraduate students 
   G r o u p    
   
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
∑ 
R W R W R W R W 
6 13 5 13 5 13 16 39 
 
1 
Task 1 Task 3 Task 2 29% 71% 
R W R W R W R W 
10 9 7 11 0 18 17 38 
 
2 
Task 2 Task 1 Task 3 31% 69% 
R W R W R W R W 
7 12 10 8 7 11 24 31 
R
 
u
 
n
 
 
3 
Task 3 Task 2 Task 1 44% 56% 
 R W R W R W R W 
 
 
∑ 23 34 22 32 12 42 57 108 
  40% 60% 41% 59% 22% 78% 35% 65% 
 
R = Right (in the sense of a rational decision made by correctly applying Bayes’ Rule); W = Wrong (that means 
that the decision follows the person’s private signal). 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Session II: 50 graduate students 
   G r o u p    
   
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
∑ 
R W R W R W R W 
10 6 3 14 8 9 21 29 
 
1 
Task 1 Task 3 Task 2 42% 58% 
R W R W R W R W 
9 7 6 11 5 12 20 30 
 
2 
Task 2 Task 1 Task 3 40% 60% 
R W R W R W R W 
8 8 6 11 5 12 19 31 
R
 
u
 
n
 
 
3 
Task 3 Task 2 Task 1 38% 62% 
 R W R W R W R W 
 
 
∑ 27 21 15 36 18 33 60 90 
  56% 44% 29% 71% 35% 65% 40% 60% 
 
R = Right (in the sense of a rational decision made by correctly applying Bayes’ Rule); W = Wrong (that means 
that the decision follows the person’s private signal). 
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Table 10 
Session III: 46 undergraduate students 
   G r o u p    
   
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
∑ 
R W R W R W R W 
6 10 7 8 4 11 17 29 
 
1 
Task 1 Task 3 Task 2 37% 63% 
R W R W R W R W 
7 9 7 8 2 13 16 30 
 
2 
Task 2 Task 1 Task 3 35% 65% 
R W R W R W R W 
4 12 6 9 8 7 18 28 
R
 
u
 
n
 
 
3 
Task 3 Task 2 Task 1 39% 61% 
 R W R W R W R W 
 
 
∑ 17 31 20 25 14 31 51 87 
  35% 65% 44% 56% 31% 69% 38% 62% 
 
R = Right (in the sense of a rational decision made by correctly applying Bayes’ Rule); W = Wrong (that means 
that the decision follows the person’s private signal). 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Session IV: 37 graduate students 
   G r o u p    
   
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
∑ 
R W R W R W R W 
3 9 3 9 6 7 12 25 
 
1 
Task 1 Task 3 Task 2 32% 68% 
R W R W R W R W 
4 8 7 5 1 12 12 25 
 
2 
Task 2 Task 1 Task 3 32% 68% 
R W R W R W R W 
3 9 5 7 3 10 11 26 
R
 
u
 
n
 
 
3 
Task 3 Task 2 Task 1 30% 70% 
 R W R W R W R W 
 
 
∑ 10 26 15 21 10 29 35 76 
  28% 72% 42% 58% 26% 74% 32% 68% 
 
R = Right (in the sense of a rational decision made by correctly applying Bayes’ Rule); W = Wrong (that means 
that the decision follows the person’s private signal). 
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Table 12 
Session V: 24 undergraduate and graduate students 
   G r o u p    
   
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
∑ 
R W R W R W R W 
5 5 3 4 3 4 11 13 
 
1 
Task 1 Task 3 Task 2 46% 54% 
R W R W R W R W 
3 7 4 3 2 5 9 15 
 
2 
Task 2 Task 1 Task 3 37% 63% 
R W R W R W R W 
2 8 4 3 2 5 8 16 
R
 
u
 
n
 
 
3 
Task 3 Task 2 Task 1 33% 67% 
 R W R W R W R W 
 
 
∑ 10 20 11 10 7 14 28 44 
  33% 67% 52% 48% 33% 67% 39% 61% 
 
R = Right (in the sense of a rational decision made by correctly applying Bayes’ Rule); W = Wrong (that means 
that the decision follows the person’s private signal). 
 
 
Table 13 
Session VI: 15 postgraduate students (corresponds to an MBA) with no order of the tasks, 
with the possibility to communicate among the subjects, and handing in after 36 hours 
maximum to work on it. 
   G r o u p    
   
1 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
∑ 
R W R W R W R W 
2 3 1 4 2 3 5 10 
 
1 
Task 1 Task 3 Task 2 33% 67% 
R W R W R W R W 
2 3 2 3 1 4 5 10 
 
2 
Task 2 Task 1 Task 3 33% 67% 
R W R W R W R W 
3 2 2 3 2 3 7 8 
R
 
u
 
n
 
 
3 
Task 3 Task 2 Task 1 47% 53% 
 R W R W R W R W 
 
 
∑ 7 8 5 10 5 10 17 28 
  47% 53% 33% 67% 33% 67% 38% 62% 
 
R = Right (in the sense of a rational decision made by correctly applying Bayes’ Rule); W = Wrong (that means 
that the decision follows the person’s private signal). 
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Appendix C. Detailed ways of solution of the three tasks 
Task 1: The only predecessor chose B; thus the conclusion is that his private signal was b. 
The subject receives the private signal a. The two private signals neutralize each other, so the 
decision must be based on the a priori probability. Therefore action B is the right one.  
Task 2: The first predecessor chose A, from which it follows that his private signal is a. The 
second predecessor chose B, which hints at b as his private signal. The third predecessor has 
obviously also received signal b because had he received a, A would have been the rational 
decision (two a’s would have exceeded b with a reliability of the signals of 0.65, even when 
the a priori probability speaks for B). Now the student receives signal a. He must note that the 
private signals of his predecessors and his own private signal exactly neutralize each other 
(two a’s and two b’s). Therefore the subject again has to orient himself towards the a priori 
probability, which speaks for action B. 
Task 3: It is necessary to calculate the more probable of the two alternative actions. 
α , β   = States of the world  prob ( α | a )  = 0.60 
prob ( α ) = 0.49    prob ( β | a )  = 0.40 
prob ( β ) = 0.51    prob ( α | b )  = 0.35 
a, b  = Signals    prob ( β | b )  = 0.65 
 
prob ( a | α ) = 
( ) (
( )
prob a prob
prob a
)α α
 
 
prob (a)  = prob ( α | a ) * prob ( α ) + prob ( β | a ) * prob ( β ) 
  = 0.60 * 0.49 + 0.40 * 0.51 
  = 0.498 
 
prob ( a | α ) = 0.6*0.49 0.294 0.590361445
0.498 0.498
= =  
 
prob (b | α) = 
( ) (
( )
prob b prob
prob b
)α α
 
 
prob (b)  = prob ( α | b ) * prob ( α ) + prob ( β | b ) * prob ( β ) 
  = 0.35 * 0.49 + 0.65 * 0.51 = 0.503 
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prob ( b | α ) = 0.35*0.49 0.1715 0.340954274
0.503 0.503
= =  
 
prob ( a | β ) = 0.4*0.51 0.204 0.409638554
0.498 0.498
= =  
 
prob ( b | β ) = 0.65*0.51 0.3315 0.659045725
0.503 0.503
= =  
 
prob ( α | aab )   =  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
prob aab prob
prob aab prob prob aab prob
α α
α α β+ β  
 
 =  ( )( ) ( )
2
2 2
0.590361445 *0.340954274*0.49
0.590361445 *0.340954274*0.49 0.409638554 *0.659045725*0.51+  
 
 =  0.058227506 0.507966743
0.058227506 0.056401073
=+  
The decision for alternative A is the rational one, because it is more probable. 
 17
Page 19 of 21 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
References 
 
Anderson, L.R., Holt, C.A., 1997. Information cascades in the laboratory. The American 
Economic Review 87, 847-862. 
Banerjee, A.V., 1992. A simple model of herd behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
107, 797-817.  
Bikhchandani, S., Hishleifer, D., Welch, I., 1992. A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and 
cultural change as informational cascades. Journal of Political Economy 100, 992-1026. 
Celen, B., Kariv, S., 2004. Distinguishing information cascades from herd behavior in the 
laboratory. The American Economic Review 94, 484-498. 
Goeree, J. K., Holt, C. A., 1999. Stochastic game theory: for playing games, not just for doing 
theory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 96, 10564-10567. 
Goeree, J. K., Holt, C. A., 2004. A model of noisy introspection. Games and Economic 
Behavior 46, 365-382. 
Huck, S., Oechssler, J., 2000. Informational cascades in the laboratory: do they occur for the 
right reasons? Journal of Economic Psychology 21, 661-671. 
Huck, S., Normann, H.-T., Oechssler, J., 2003. Zero-knowledge cooperation in dilemma 
games. Journal of Theoretical Biology 220, 47-54. 
Huck, S., Normann, H.-T., Oechssler, J., 2004. Through trial and error to collusion. 
International Economic Review 45, 205-224. 
Hung, A.A., Plott, C.R., 2001. Information cascades: replication and an extension to majority 
rule and conformity-rewarding institutions. The American Economic Review 91, 1508-
1520. 
Keynes, J.M., 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. London: 
Macmillan. 
 18
Page 20 of 21 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Kübler, D., Weizsäcker, G., 2004. Limited depth of reasoning and failure of cascade 
formation in the laboratory. Review of Economic Studies 71, 425-441. 
Selten, R., Abbink, K., Buchta, J., Sadrieh, A., 2003. How to play (3 x 3)-games. A strategy 
method experiment. Games and Economic Behavior 45, 19-37. 
Sgroi, D., 2003. The right choice at the right time: a herding experiment in endogenous time. 
Experimental Economics 6, 159-180. 
 19
Page 21 of 21 
